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Abstract. The entities participating in a context-aware service platform need to 
establish and manage trust relationships in order to assert different trust aspects 
including identity provisioning, privacy enforcement, and context information 
provisioning. Current trust management models address these trust aspects 
individually when in fact they are dependent on each other. In this paper we 
identify and analyze the trust relationships in a context-aware service platform 
and propose an integrated trust management model that supports quantification 
of trust for different trust aspects. Our model addresses a set of trust aspects that 
is relevant for our target context-aware service platform and is extensible with 
other trust aspects. We propose to calculate a resulting trust value for context-
aware services, which considers the dependencies between the different trust 
aspects, and aims to support the users in the selection of the more trustworthy 
services. In this calculation we target two types of user goals: one with high 
priority in privacy enforcement (privacy concerned) and one with high priority 
in the service adaptation (service concerned). Based on our trust model we have 
designed a distributed trust management architecture and implemented a proof 
of concept prototype. 
1 Introduction 
Context-aware services use context information to adapt themselves to the current 
situation. Adaptive service provisioning offers compelling business opportunities 
(e.g., personalization of offers and control of the quality of service) and new 
technological challenges, such as, for example, the management of context 
information in order to not violate the user’s privacy preferences. 
In order to reach a widespread success, context-aware services must be 
trustworthy. The trustworthiness of a context-aware service depends on the trust 
relationships among the entities, such as, service, identity and context providers, that 
cooperate during the service provisioning. For example, users of context-aware 
services may not accept that privacy sensitive [1] context information is released if 
they do not trust the service providers receiving the information; service providers 
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may, in turn, demand trustworthy context providers in order to ensure that the context 
information has the minimum required quality for service adaptation [2]; finally, 
context providers may request trustworthy identity providers to ensure that the 
retrieved context information corresponds to the correct identity. The trust of a user in 
the context-aware service depends on all these trust relationships, and the trust 
relationships also depends on each other, e.g., the trust in the context provider 
depends on the trust in the identity provider that identifies the context provider. 
Existing trust models propose special-purpose solutions that are not easily portable 
to our context-aware domain because they either specify incomplete trust 
relationships related to at most one trust aspect (e.g., enforcement of access control 
procedures [5], integrity of identities [6], or the enforcement of privacy policies [7]) 
or make no distinction between different trust aspects because users need to trust a 
centralized service as a whole, for instance, in the way it is done by e-bay [8].  
We define a new trust management model for context-aware service platforms that 
explicitly addresses trust relationships for different trust aspects and their 
interdependencies. We identify and analyze a set of interconnected trust relationships 
related to specific trust aspects that satisfy the trust requirements of our target context-
aware service platform (the Freeband AWARENESS service platform [9]). Our trust 
management model, or trust model for short, addresses a basic set of trust aspects 
related to identity provisioning, privacy enforcement, and context provisioning 
activities. This list is not exhaustive and can be extended with other trust aspects 
when needed. Our model supports both direct trust resulting from direct experience 
and indirect trust derived from trust calculations, for example, based on 
recommendations from other entities. 
Our trust model evaluates the trust users have in a context-aware service by taking 
into account the interdependencies between the three different trust aspects that we 
consider. Based on specific user goals, the trust values in the privacy enforcement and 
context provisioning aspects have different weights in the resulting trust in the 
service. Based on [10] we address two types of user goals: one demanding with higher 
priority the enforcement of his/her privacy rules and the second one demanding with 
higher priority the service adaptation. With the calculation of a resulting trust value 
from the trust values for different trust aspects we want to assist users in the selection 
of more trustworthy context-aware services. 
In our target context-aware service platform [9], it is not acceptable that one central 
entity is responsible for the management of the trust relationships for all other entities, 
because different administrative domains may be involved. Each and every 
administrative domain has its own components and management infrastructure and, 
for this reason, we also propose a distributed trust management architecture. Our trust 
management architecture instantiates our trust model and is currently implemented in 
a peer-to-peer prototype using JXTA [11]. We present the current proof-of-concept 
implementation of our trust model which uses the Subjective Logic [12] API for trust 
calculations. In the prototype the user can select his goal (privacy enforcement or 
service adaptation) and see the resulting trust value for the available context-aware 
services. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of our target 
context-aware service platform identifying entities, roles, and trust relationships. 
Section 3 presents our trust management model and an algorithm for the combination 
of trust values regarding different trust aspects. Section 4 presents our architecture for 
distributed trust management and our prototype implementation. Section 5 compares 
our work to the state of the art on trust for distributed, pervasive, and context-aware 
service platforms. Section 6 summarizes our conclusions and provides a discussion on 
future work. 
2 Trust Relationships in a Context-Aware Service Platform 
Figure 1 presents our target context-aware service platform [9] and illustrates the five 
roles we distinguish in it, namely users, context owners, identity providers, context 
providers, and service providers. 
 
Fig. 1.  Roles in a context-aware service platform and their interactions when a user accesses a 
service provider. User and context owner roles are played by the same entity. 
The arrows in Figure 1 indicate the basic interactions between the roles when a 
user accesses a service provider. First the user authenticates with an identity provider 
(1) and receives an identity token (2). After the authentication is done, the user can 
access the service provider (3), where the service will verify the identity token of the 
user (4). To be able to adapt the service to the user’s context, the service provider 
retrieves context information about the user (here also the context owner) from a 
context provider (5 and 6). This information can be, for instance, the current activity 
or location of the user; however, it can also include context information about other 
entities that are relevant for the context-aware service being used. 
In our context-aware service platform roles are dynamically assigned during the 
service provisioning. In a particular scenario, it is possible that multiple entities play 
the same role, and that one entity plays more than one role; for example, a person 
holding a GPS device might play at the same time the user, the context owner and 
context provider roles.   
2.1 Analysis of Trust Aspects 
In our service platform trust is a critical issue. The context owner must trust the 
context provider and the service provider, because they are going to manage his/her 
context information. The context owner will demand its context information to be 
released only when his privacy policies allow such, and he will only accept his 
context information to be managed if he trusts that both context providers and service 
providers are able and willing to adhere to his/her privacy policies.  
In addition, the user and the service provider trust the context provider regarding 
the provisioning of context information. This trust aspect is important to guarantee 
that this information is provided with the required quality characteristics and 
consequently resulting in the expected context-aware service adaptation. Trust in the 
context provider from the service provider point of view is also required in case 
dynamic security policies based in context information are used (e.g. [13]), which 
may require additional security verifications in case untrustworthy context 
information is received. An example of additional security verifications could be, for 
example, redundant check of context obtained from different context providers. 
Finally, all the entities have trust relationships with an identity provider because 
they present and receive credentials (issued by the identity provider) in order to 
identify themselves to other entities in the service platform. Even though Figure 1 
presents (for simplicity) only user authentication and identity verification, with only 
one identity provider (arrows 1 and 4),  also context owners, service providers, 
context providers, and identity providers themselves should provide identity 
credentials when interacting with other entities. Even so, it is not required for all the 
entities to be authenticated with the same identity provider. 
Figure 2 depicts the trust relationships among the user, the context-owner, the 
identity provider, the service provider, and the context provider, namely identity 
provisioning, privacy enforcement and context provisioning trust relationships. These 
relationships are interpersonal relationships where each of them has an entity that sets 
up the trust relationship with another entity, called respectively the Trustor and the 
Trustee [3]. This set of trust relationships is by no means exhaustive; other trust 
relationships targeting different aspects can be identified if different scenarios would 
be considered. Our objective here is to propose a basic set, based on our target service 
platform, and motivate the definition of different trust relationships for different trust 
aspects, including their dependencies. 
 Fig. 2. Trust relationships in context-aware service platforms for different aspects. 
For each type of trust relationships presented in Figure 2 it is possible to establish a 
trust value according to certain aspect-specific metric. The following subsection 
present metrics for obtaining trust values related to identity provisioning, privacy 
enforcement and context information provisioning. 
2.2 Metrics for obtaining trust values 
This section discusses existing metrics that can be used to quantify the amount of 
trust for each type of trust relationship. 
Identity Provisioning. One metric that influences the identity provisioning trust is 
the authentication method. Identity providers that use very strong biometric 
authentication should be more trusted than others that use only username/password 
authentication. It is also possible to associate the identity provisioning trust value with 
a specific session, according to the type of authentication used for that session, in case 
the identity provider supports more then one type of authentication method. The user 
registration policy also influences the identity provisioning trust. Identity providers 
that allow users to freely register without verifying the identity of the user (e.g. 
Google and Yahoo) may not be trusted as much as identity providers that do not allow 
free registration, such as a university or a bank. 
Privacy Enforcement. Trust in privacy enforcement depends upon the existence 
of privacy policies in the context provider and service provider (e.g. P3P policies [7]), 
which state how the context owner’s data will be handled. These privacy policies 
should be compared with the context owner’s privacy preferences and, in case they 
match, it is assumed that the privacy expectations will be followed. The following 
metrics have also been proposed by [14] and [7] to calculate trust values regarding 
privacy enforcement aspects: user interest in sharing, confidentiality level of the 
information, number of positive previous experiences, number of arbitrary hops, a 
priori probability of distrusting, and service popularity in search engines. The number 
of arbitrary hops is related with identities issues and the chain of certificate authorities 
between the source and the target of the information. Privacy enforcement trust values 
can be also obtained from trusted third parties specialized in privacy protection issues. 
Privacy protection organizations take care of privacy policies certification in the same 
way identities are certified today by certification authorities [15]. We foresee that 
privacy recommendations will be provided by informal organizations such as virtual 
users’ communities and customer protection organizations. 
Context Information Provisioning. The trust in the context providers can be 
evaluated, for example, through cryptographic mechanisms based on PKI (identity 
coupled) and through the following metrics and mechanisms: reputation of context 
provider, statistical analysis of context information provided from the source, and 
context aggregators that compare redundant information from different sources in 
order to increase trustworthiness. It is also possible to evaluate the trust of the context 
information based in the trustworthiness of the quality aspects [2] of one particular 
instance of context, or in the method used to obtain the information. One example is 
location information, which trustworthiness may vary depending on how the 
information is obtained: from outlook calendars, user personal GPS position, or 
position of the GSM/WiFi base station to which the user is connected. 
3 Trust Management Model for Context-Aware Service Platforms 
After motivating the need for the different trust aspects in our context-aware service 
platform in the previous section, this section discusses an algorithm to measure and 
combine trust for each trust aspect relevant in our architecture. Well-known concepts 
like trust establishment, direct and indirect trust, and recommendations are 
instantiated to match the trust requirements of our service platform. We show how the 
trust values related to different aspects can be combined into an overall 
trustworthiness evaluation of the context-aware service from the user point of view. 
Here, we restrict our analysis to two user-profile perspectives: the first one with 
higher priority on privacy enforcement and the second one with higher priority on the 
service adaptation. This section ends with a discussion on the integration of trust 
recommendations in our trust model. 
3.1 Formalization of Aspect-Specific Trust Relationships 
Many models for trust management exist (e.g., see [3][4][16] and Section 5 of this 
paper). Most of these models refer to a specific application domain and, as such, 
propose special-purpose solutions that are not easily portable to other domains: our 
context-aware domain requires a specific formalism of combining trust aspects we 
have not found treated appropriately in the literature. Despite we have not researched 
in this direction, we do not exclude that existing formalisms for trust (e.g., [17]) can 
be extended to express and combine multiple trust aspects as it is required by our 
domain. 
As widely accepted, we formalize trust as a relationship between two entities, the 
Trustor and the Trustee [3]. In its more general definition [16], a trust relationship 
represents a subjective measurement of belief from a Trustor concerned with a certain 
Trustee behavior and focused on a certain trust aspect. For example, Bob (Trustor) 
may trust at a high degree Alice (Trustee) for what concerns her competence in 
coding in Java. The Trustee’s behavior is part of the social perspective of trust. 
Trustors can perceive or interpret the Trustee’s behavior as an isolated or combined 
measurement of, for example, honesty, competency, reputation, usability, credibility 
and reliability. In this paper we consider behavior as “honesty, competence, and 
reliability”. Other behaviors are also important and will be considered in our future 
work. A list of possible trustee behaviors and their correlations based in user studies 
can be found in [18]. The trust aspect models different scopes that can be tackled by 
the trust relationships. As motivated in Subsection 2.1, for our target context-aware 
service platform we address the following aspects: identity provisioning, privacy 
enforcement, and context information provisioning. The metrics presented in 
Subsection 2.2 are examples of how to obtain trust values for these aspects. 
Regarding the choice of the domain of trust values, existing trust models have 
different proposals. Some authors quantify trust as a real numeric value (e.g., between 
-1 and 1), a discrete value (e.g., trust or distrust), or a combination of both where each 
element in the discrete set has a numeric equivalent (e.g., values in (0, 1] mean trust, 
values in [-1, 0) denote distrust, and 0 means unknown).   
Our proposal is independent from any particular solution; we assume a generic 
domain TValue. As a matter of example we instantiate TValue in the set of opinions 
of the Subjective Logic (in short, SL) [12], which supports uncertainty and provides 
operators to deal with trust opinions calculations, for example, discount, addition and 
consensus. Accordingly to the SL theory, trust in a certain proposition is expressed 
with a triple (b, d, u) ∈ [0, 1]3 that represents respectively the Trustor’s subjective 
belief (b), disbelief (d), and uncertainty (u). With 
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we indicate a trust relation between A (the Trustor) and B (the Trustee) that tackles on 
the trust aspect a and that has degree v (see also Figure 1). B here can also represent a 
category. “*” is a place-holder for classes of trust relation. In this paper we will 
consider two classes of trust relations: direct functional (df) and indirect functional 
 (if), so * ∈ {id, if }. Direct trust originates from A’s direct experiences or evaluations 
of B. Indirect trust originates when A’s resorts to indirect evaluating B’s trust, for 
example, by combining trust values or asking for recommendations from other 
entities (see also [4]). In our formalism A and B are entities’ identities which belongs 
to a set ID. Aspect a ranges over identity provisioning, privacy enforcement, and 
context information provisioning, that is a∈{idp, pe, cip}. 
Identities are assigned to different roles in different instances of our platform. We 
consider the set of roles R = {US, CO, IP, CP, SP} from our context-aware service 
platform (Section 2), namely, user, context owner, identity provider, context provider 
and service provider. The function role: ID→ R returns the role that, in the present 
moment, a given entity identified by an identity ID plays; running this function is of 
exclusive competence of identity providers, but it can be invoked by any entity that 
has registered its identity (see Figure 1, arrow 1). 
3.2 Trust Evaluation 
Abstracting from the actual trust metric evaluation that will be applied in an 
instance of our platform (for details on metrics for the different trust aspects see 
Subsection 2.2), we assume that entities can access a set of functions that calculate, 
respectively, the direct trust value from a Trustor to a Trustee based on the evaluation 
of its privacy enforcement (pe), identity provisioning (idp), and context information 
provisioning (cip) qualities. These functions receive as input the Trustor and Trustee 
identities (ID× ID) and return the trust value for the specific trust aspect: 
 
trust_PE:    ID× ID → TValues 
trust_IDP:  ID× ID → TValues 
trust_CIP:  ID× ID → TValues 
 
For example, trust_PE(Alice, Bob) is the evaluation of Bob’s honesty, competence, 
and reliability in its privacy enforcement aspect, from the Alice’s view point. 
Considering the metrics in Subsection 2.2, it is easy to image that Alice provides a 
trustworthiness profile against which Bob qualities are compared and evaluated. Here 
we assume a trusted-third party role, the Trust Provider whose task is to run those 
functions on demand and on behalf of Trustors. These functions are our starting point 
for trust evaluation; on their output we can establish the degree of trust between the 
Trustor and the Trustee. If we specify our reasoning in term of an inference system, 
i.e., in terms of axioms and deductive rules of the form premises/conclusion the 
functions we have identified in this section can be used, at a meta-level, to define our 
set of axioms. In all the following rules, which express our algorithm, we assume that 
role(A) = US, that is the Trustor A is a user. 
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For example, in the first rule when trust_PE is invoked with parameters A and B it 
returns a value v, which states that A has degree v of (direct) trust in B, with respect 
the aspect pe (privacy enforcement). This aspect is significant when Trustee B is a 
context provider, an identity provider and a service provider. In the following we use 
the deductive style formalization to depict the main characteristic of our algorithm of 
trust evaluation and composition. 
As we have seen in the previous section, it is the responsibility of the identity 
provider to provide the identity of the entity that plays a certain role. Moreover, we 
have defined trust as a relation between identities. We therefore conclude that trust in 
an identity is influenced by the trust (regarding the trust aspect idp) in the identity 
provider that has provided that identity. The trust value associated with the provider 
or issuer of the trustee identity influences all the trust values associated with that 
identity. This reflects the case that it is not possible to trust the trust values associated 
with some identity that is not trusted. This inter-relation between trust in identities 
and trust in identity providers is synthesized by the following inference rule for 
indirect trust: 
identity s' provides 
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The previous rule express the following: if A’s direct trust degree in B regarding 
aspect a is v, and if the identity of B is provided by identity provider C, and if A’s 
indirect trust in C for aspect identity provisioning is v′, then A’s indirect trust in B 
regarding aspect a is v′⊗v, which represents the value v discounted by the value v ′ 
(e.g. v′⊗v ≤ v).In the SL domain set, the ⊗ can be mapped onto the discounting 
operator. 
Once the user has established a trust relationship with all the entities playing the 
context provider and service provider roles, (trust that as we explained has been 
influenced by the trust the user has in the identity providers), the user deduce its trust 
in the role itself. This passage is a generalization step, quite important in our 
framework, because the user is willing to evaluate its trust in the service considering 
that the context provide and the service provider roles may be played by more than 
one entity. The following rules express this generalization step for the context 
provider role (CP). The rules for the generalization step concerning the service 
provider role (SP) are similar.  
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Here a≠idp, because identity provisioning has been already in place. The rule on 
the left says that A’s trust in the CP role, can be initiated with the trust A has on one 
members of the CP role. The rule on the right says that new members can contribute 
to the A’s trust in the CP role; so if A’s trust in the role CP is v, and if A’s trust in the 
member C is v’, then the new A’s trust in the role is v⊕v’. Here v⊕v’ expresses a 
“fair” combination of the two trust values as, for example, SL consensus operator.  
We are now ready to the final step of our algorithm, which consist in evaluating the 
user’s trust in a context-aware service. It depends on trust he/she has on both the roles 
CP and SP regarding privacy and context provisioning aspects, and where the context 
provisioning aspect is only influenced by CP. We assume two different user profiles, 
the first one with higher priority in the privacy enforcement and which will accept to 
have less service adaptation, and the second one with higher priority on context-aware 
service adaptation even if his/her privacy is not respected [10]. We name these two 
profiles privacy focused and service focused users. The rule that express how to 
calculate A’s (user) trust on a service provider B, when context provider role is played 
by entities in S, is formalized as follows: 
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Here the user combines his trust in the service in the privacy enforcement aspect, and 
the trust he has in the context provider role in the context provisioning aspect. 
Function f expresses a particular way of aggregating trust, which depends on the user 
profile. In the following we are going to consider two use profiles, the first one 
focusing on privacy enforcing aspect and the second one on service provisioning 
aspect. 
In order to give an example of f, and for illustration purposes, we map TValues into 
the ordered set {VT, T, U, VU} whose elements model judgment of user perspectives: 
very untrustworthy (VU), untrustworthy (U), trustworthy (T), and very trustworthy 
(VT). We assume that VT > T > U > VU.  Figure 3 depicts an example of how to 
identify user judgments in our domain of reference. An opinion v whose belief is 
higher than disbelief, is considered trustworthy (i.e., v∈T) if it has uncertainty not 
lower than 1/3 and very trustworthy (i.e., v∈ VT) otherwise. One opinion v whose 
belief is not higher than disbelief, is considered untrustworthy (i.e., v∈U) if it has 
uncertainty not lower than 1/3 and very trustworthy (i.e., v∈ VU) otherwise. 
An example of function f can be obtained by first applying pi to v and v’, then 
applying one of the function of Figure 4, and then by mapping back each user 
category onto a “representative” opinion of that category. For example a 
representative opinion of VT can be the triple (0.75; 0.01; 0.24), of T can be (0.50; 
0.01; 0.49), and so on. To the best of our knowledge, functions with the properties 
sketched in Figure 4 cannot be obtained by composing existing SL operators with pi. 
Informally, Figure 4 shows the resulting trust in the service when the trust 
expectation in the service provider regarding the privacy enforcement aspect and the 
trust expectation in the context provider regarding the context information 
provisioning increase. The best case scenario for both user profiles is the one where 
the trust expectations for both privacy enforcement and context information 
provisioning trust aspects at least trustworthy. 
  
Fig. 3. The function pi: [0, 1]3 {VT, T, U, VU} that maps a SL opinion onto the set of user 
judgments. 
Accordingly to Figure 4 (a), for the privacy focused profile the best cases are when 
the privacy enforcement is at least trustworthy. The worst cases is when the privacy 
enforcement is untrustworthy, because is more likely that trustworthy context 
information about the user will be under a privacy risk. For the service focused profile 
(Figure4 (b)) the best cases are when the context provisioning is at least trustworthy 
where it is even better when the privacy is also enforced. The worst cases are when 
the context information is not trustworthy, which results in a bad service adaptation, 
however in this case it is preferable to have privacy enforcement if possible. We 
assume here that a context-aware service receiving untrustworthy context information 
is more likely to adapt wrongly to the current user situation. From this discussion we 
support the conclusion that for both user profiles the best case is when trust in the 
context information and privacy enforcement is high, however, depending in the 
profile the worst case scenario is not the same. 
 
Fig. 4. Resulting trust in the service accordingly to a user profile that focuses on privacy (a) and 
on a user profile that focuses on service (b). 
3.3 Extension of the basic algorithm: Recommendations 
Since users may interact with entities that are unknown (or whose features are 
unknown) and with which they have had no previous experiences, we support 
recommendation management in trust relationships in our model in a similar way to 
the approach adopted by [19]. By using recommendations (indirect) trust can be 
established based on information received from other entities. Each entity can have an 
a priori trust value regarding the recommendation aspect about other entities in the 
system, stating a level of trust in the recommendations received from that entity.  
In order to merge the recommendations received from many entities, for example, 
we can use the solution proposed in [27]. Here the SL consensus operator is used to 
merge considering uncertainty in a “fair” way and if entities receive conflicting 
recommendations this increases the uncertainty in the trust values. This is slightly 
different from the proposal of [19] where an average function is used and where 
conflicting recommendations may result in a lack of information about trust. One 
major drawback of the approach done by [19] is that they do not consider uncertainty, 
which may result in less accurate trust results when conflicting opinions are 
combined. 
Our recommendation algorithm requires a Trust Provider role (TP), to which 
identities ask for recommendations. Note that, as discussed in the previous section, TP 
is expected to receive feedbacks from identities regarding their trust on others, and it 
is responsible to the synthesis of an overall recommendation. More advanced 
algorithms to calculate trust from indirect knowledge are presented in [20]. We leave 
as a future work the formalization and evaluation of trust recommendations exchange 
in our trust model using the SL consensus operator. 
4 Distributed Trust Management Architecture 
A context-aware service platform is typically a distributed system without a unique 
central point of control. In such a system, in some cases implemented in a fully ad-
hoc configuration, multiple administrative domains may exist. To illustrate this, 
consider a weather service which provides for mobile phone users the local weather 
forecast based on the latitude/longitude of the GSM cell they are in. In this case, the 
weather service provider, the mobile phone operator, and the user personal devices 
are examples of different administrative domains controlled by different 
administrative entities. 
In this multi administrative domain scenario it is not possible to have a centralized 
trust provider responsible for the management of all trust relationships due to privacy 
and scalability reasons. In order to support distributed management of trust we 
designed a distributed trust management architecture, which is presented in Figure 5. 
Fig. 5. Distributed Trust Management Architecture 
Our architecture supports distributed management of trust considering that each 
administrative domain has its own trust provider. Using the graphical user interface 
(GUI) users can visualize and change their trust relationships and also provide 
feedback of their experiences by informing trust observations. The objective of this 
trust database is to manually support users in the selection of more trustworthy 
context-aware services and also provide input for automated policy components 
where decisions can be automatically taken based on policies that use the trust values 
in their conditions. 
In case trust evidence is not available in one administrative domain, our 
architecture support the propagation of recommendations requests to other domains, 
for example, using existing social network connections such as buddy lists. The 
following section presents our prototype implementation where our trust model and 
management architecture is currently implemented as a proof of concept. 
4.1 Prototype Implementation 
We have implemented our trust model and architecture in a proof of concept 
prototype using the JXTA peer-to-peer library [11] and the Subjective Logic API [12] 
for trust calculations based on opinions. Figure 6 presents the user agent screen of our 
prototype where users can visualize in different tabs the context aware services, 
context providers, and identity providers available in the network. Users can also see 
their current identity and selected the context providers they want to use from the list 
of available context providers in the respective tab. 
  
Fig. 6. Visualization of trust for users with high priority in service adaptation 
For each entity the interface displays the identity description and a colored 
representation of the calculated trust. The colors range from dark to light green for 
trustworthy entities, grey for uncertain, and dark to light red for untrustworthy 
entities. The colors represent the trust value regarding role specific aspects, for 
example, in the context providers tab the trust value displayed is the value for the 
context provisioning trust aspect. We calculate the resulting trust value for each trust 
aspect considering the dependency with the identity provider that provides the identity 
of each entity, following our trust model formalism described in Section 3. We use for 
that the SL discount operator. 
Figure 6 and 7 are examples of the same “context aware services” tab after the user 
changes his primary goal respectively from “Service adaptation” in Figure 6 to 
“Privacy enforcement” in Figure 7. In Figure 6, for the user goal “Service adaptation” 
the resulting trust in the “Health Care Anywhere Service” is trustworthy because the 
trust in the context provider “Personal GPS device” is very trustworthy. In Figure 7, 
when the user changes his goal to “Privacy enforcement” the resulting trust in the 
service became very untrustworthy, because the trust value for this service regarding 
the privacy enforcement trust aspect is untrustworthy (see Figure 7). The resulting 
trust in the service changes to very untrustworthy following exactly the function we 
presented in Figure 4 Section 3.2). This function states that untrustworthy services 
receiving trustworthy context information are a major privacy risk for privacy 
concerned users. 
 Fig. 7.  Visualization of trust for users with high priority in privacy enforcement 
Figure 8 presents the “Trust details” screen where users can see and change, after a 
double-click in an entity, the detailed trust information. In this screen it is possible to 
see the name of the identity provider that identifies the identity and details about the 
trust values (including the colored scale). In this screen we do not present the triple 
belief (b), disbelief (d), and uncertainty (u) from SL for each trust value. For 
simplicity we decided to show the SL expectation value, which is a linear 
representation from 0 to 1 more easily understandable for users of a trust value. 
Our prototype uses the JXTA peer-to-peer communication model for publishing 
and discovering entities in the network however we do not support in the current 
prototype implementation the exchange of trust recommendations nor user experience 
reports displayed in our trust architecture. Our next step is to implement the exchange 
of trust recommendation requests and responses using the SL consensus operator (as 
described in Subsection 3.3) to merge the trust recommendations responses.  
In the current prototype we have also not implemented any metric for direct trust 
calculation presented in Subsection 2.2, we have arbitrarily defined initial trust values 
for each aspect and entity in order to illustrate the usefulness of our model. More 
details about our next research steps are presented together with the conclusions of 
this paper in Section 6. 
 
 Fig. 8.  Visualization of know identities and trust details 
5 Related Work 
The research on trust can be approached from the social, informational, and technical 
points of view [10]. For each of these perspectives there are different trust issues that 
should be addressed, for instance, how users perceive the trust in the system [21] 
(social), what are the concepts and semantics of trust mapped into the system 
(informational), and how secure is the encryption technology used (technical).  In this 
paper we are especially interested on the informational level. 
Grandinson and Sloman [22] propose a trust specification and analysis framework 
for internet applications called SULTAN. In SULTAN trust levels are defined from a 
Trustor perspective for different allowed Trustee actions. SULTAN does not support 
the combination of different trust levels and does not consider trust for different 
aspects like identity provisioning. 
The Pervasive Trust Model (PTM) of Almenárez et al. [19] applies the concept of 
trust degrees in the definition of access control policies. They support in their work 
direct trust by previous knowledge and indirect trust based on recommendations. The 
final trust degree for an entity is calculated as the average of the recommendations 
and only recommendations from trusted identities are processed. They do not 
explicitly support trust quantification for identities and also do not target specifically 
context-aware service platforms. 
A specific approach for trust definition and management for context-aware 
applications is proposed by Daskapan et al. [13]. In their approach they target privacy 
aspects and provide a heuristic model to evaluate trustworthiness of context 
consumers, in order to influence user privacy policy decisions. If the evaluated trust is 
under a certain threshold then user consent is required, otherwise, the context provider 
decides automatically, on behalf of the user, whether the context information should 
be provided or not based on the computed trust value. For Dakaspan et al. trust is a 
function of the number of previous experiences, the number of hops, and the a priori 
probability of distrusting the Trustee. Kolari et al. [7] also proposes trust for privacy 
where trust values are associated with privacy policies in the Platform for Privacy 
Preferences (P3P) format. 
Liberty Alliance [23] and MSN passport are examples of identity federation and 
single sign-on solutions. When using these approaches the authentication task is 
delegated to trusted identity providers. The authentication information is then 
communicated through assertions to other entities in the system. These approaches are 
usually based on Public Key Cryptography and, in spite of being target only to 
identity issues, are sometimes wrongly applied for other trust aspects. If the identity 
of some entity is certified this does not mean that the privacy policies or context 
information provided by this entity can also be trusted. 
The relation between context-awareness and trust can also be carrier of new 
opportunities. Proposals where context information is used as input for trust 
evaluation can be found in [24][25]. Here, the inference of different levels of 
trustworthiness of a piece of data depends upon also the currently active context.  In 
[26], the context is explicitly modeled in the trust relationship that might exist 
between two agents; as such the trust relationship that results is formally 
contextualized; contextual data, when available, are thus used to guide the process of 
trust establishment whilst values of trust are assigned to each deduced relationship 
depending on the availability and on the quality of the context. We consider our 
approach in this paper as a complimentary solution in comparison with these 
solutions. 
6 Conclusions and Future Work 
We have proposed a new trust management model and architecture that supports the 
quantification of trust for the different trust aspects relevant for our target context-
aware service platform. Our model is extensible and considers trust aspects related 
with identity provisioning, privacy enforcement, and context information 
provisioning. We identify the dependencies between these trust values and develop a 
formalism to combine these different trust aspects in order to evaluate the resulting 
trust users have in a context-aware service. We address two different resulting trust 
calculations considering privacy enforcement and service provisioning concerned user 
goals. 
Our contribution in the area of context-aware computing is a trust model that 
quantifies trust relationships regarding essential trust aspects of our context-aware 
service platform and calculates the resulting trust users have in a context-aware 
service by taking into account the interdependencies between these trust relationships. 
Our trust model is extensible with other trust aspects. In addition, we have also 
designed and implemented a proof-of-concept prototype of our distributed trust 
management architecture which implements our model and assists context-aware 
service users in their trust decisions and selection of more trustworthy context-aware 
services. 
As future work we plan to use context information to improve the recommendation 
process. For example, context can be used to determine the suitable target entities to 
request recommendations from. This will allow anonymous and still useful 
recommendations exchange. Context can also be used to dynamically adapt the user 
goals. In certain context situations (e.g. health care service) users may not have 
privacy as first goal when they need the best service adaptation (e.g., to send an 
ambulance to their current trustworthy location). 
Furthermore we will research specific challenges in modeling trust between trust 
providers from different administrative domains and evaluate the usability and 
usefulness of our trust model and architecture through user studies in the Freeband 
AWARENESS project [9] using our prototype implementation. This evaluation will 
enable us to validate and fine tune our trust model.  
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